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Abstract
We propose a framework to study the spreading of urban legends, i.e., false stories that
become persistent in a local popular culture, where social groups are naturally
segregated by virtue of many (both mutable and immutable) attributes. The goal of
this work is identifying and testing new strategies to restrain the dissemination of false
information, focusing on the role of network polarization. Following the traditional
approach in the study of information diffusion, we consider an epidemic
network-based model where the agents can be ‘infected’ after being exposed to the
urban legend or to its debunking depending on the belief of their neighborhood.
Simulating the spreading process on several networks showing different kind of
segregation, we perform a what-if analysis to compare strategies and to understand
where it is better to locate eternal fact-checkers, nodes that maintain their position as
debunkers of the given urban legend. Our results suggest that very few of these
strategies have a chance to succeed. This apparently negative outcomes turns out to
be somehow surprising taking into account that we ran our simulations under a highly
pessimistic assumption, such that the ‘believers’, i.e., agents that accepted as true the
urban legend after they have been exposed to it, will not change their belief no matter
of how much external or internal additional informational sources they access to. This
has implications on policies that are supposed to decide which strategy to apply to
stop misinformation from spreading in real world networks.
Keywords: Misinformation spreading, Network segregation, Debunking strategies,
Epidemics
Introduction
Our goal is to investigate new strategies to limit false news spreading, specially in pres-
ence of existing structural, geographical and/or social barriers. If segregation seems to
be an intrinsic feature of modern urban environments, which policies can be imple-
mented to empower fact-checking platforms? At the best of our knowledge there are
some researches about identifying influential spreaders of information (Kitsak et al. 2010;
Ghosh and Lerman 2010) or rumors (Borge-Holthoefer et al. 2013), but to our knowl-
edge few efforts have been devoted to assess and compare possible debunking strategies
exploiting the network topology. In this paper, we suggest the application of a what-if anal-
ysis based on epidemic modeling in order to explore new fact-checking policies to limit
the diffusion of urban legends. This methodology is particularly useful in contexts where
we do not have data on how a given strategy to restrain misinformation would perform,
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because such action plans have never been applied in real life (or whose results have not
been disclosed to scholars yet).
Online information consumption and polarization
Recently misinformation has been largely discussed (Lazer et al. 2018; Vosoughi et al.
2018) because it can imply serious consequences to our lives: even if in some cases
fake news are intentionally disseminated to manipulate public opinion, there is a large
amount of persistent rumors, or urban legends, that look as simple popular stories but
are often related with social problems and leverage on fears, prejudices and emotions of
people (Campion-Vincent 2017; Heath et al. 2001). In this framework, digital technolo-
gies as online social networks can facilitate the spreading of misinformation, specially
because they are homophily-driven, built with the intent to connect like-minded peo-
ple and often exhibit the presence of echo chambers, highly segregated environments
with low content diversity and high degree of repetition (Adamic and Glance 2005;
Conover et al. 2011; Pariser 2011; Bozdag and van den Hoven 2015). Moreover, these
platforms involve filtering algorithms (DeVito 2017) and recommendation systems that
give disproportionate visibility to popular content within social circles. These mecha-
nisms of algorithmic personalization have been largely debated in literature to understand
if they affect the evolution of opinions (Rossi et al. 2018; Bressan et al. 2016) and polar-
ize the network (Perra and Rocha 2019; Dandekar et al. 2013; Geschke et al. 2019),
or if, conversely, they do not have a leading role in the formation of echo chambers
(Möller et al. 2018; Bakshy et al. 2015).
Segregation, homophily, and network topologies
Empirical analysis confirmed that online conversations involving misinformation appear
to be highly polarized (Del Vicario et al. 2016; Bessi et al. 2015), but research about the
role of the underlying topology of the network in information diffusion suggests that the
level of segregation can affect the spreading in different ways (Tambuscio et al. 2018;
Bakshy et al. 2012; Onnela et al. 2007; Weng et al. 2013; Nematzadeh et al. 2014). How-
ever, many attributes or factors that lead to the formation of segregated communities are
somehow ‘mutable’: for example, nodes that join or leave the network can contribute to
create new shortest paths to otherwise distant communities, interests change during time
and, as a consequence, attention to given topics. On the other hand, segregation has been
largely studied (Oka and Wong 2015; Massey and Denton 1993; 1987) and observed
(Bajardi et al. 2015; Herdag˘delen et al. 2016; Lamanna et al. 2018) in urban envi-
ronments, involving features of human life as language, religion, ethnicity, education,
employment and so on. Many of these attributes are ‘immutable’, and the topology
of the network can be shaped accordingly. The theoretical framework provided by
the Schelling model (Schelling 2006) shows that spatial segregation is somehow natu-
ral even in tolerant societies: in a simple grid where agents can change their place if
the percentage of similar individuals in their spatial proximity is lower than a given
percentage, even a small bias towards homophily, but still highly tolerant w.r.t. diver-
sities, leads to totally segregated configurations. Interestingly, these patterns have been
observed in real societies (Gracia-Lázaro et al. 2009; Clark and Fossett 2008). In our
research, to better generalize our findings, we focus on different network topologies that
can be caused by social dynamics such as preferential attachment, as well as intrinsic
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segregation patterns that are dependent on immutable characteristics of the population of
a city.
Information spreading modeling
The tradition of information (and consequently, rumor and misinformation) diffusion
modeling has involved different approaches: epidemic models (Moreno et al. 2004; Daley
and Kendall 1964), influence models (Goldenberg et al. 2001; Granovetter and Soong
1983), opinion dynamics (Castellano et al. 2009) are the most known. In particular
researchers distinguish among biological simple contagion (induced by a single exposure,
as epidemic models) and complex contagion (dependent on multiple exposures, as influ-
ence models) (Centola and Macy 2007). Even if complex contagion has been found to
well describe observed information cascades and predict their size (Lerman 2016; Møn-
sted et al. 2017; Romero et al. 2011), the complexity of the phenomenon seems to involve
other factors (Min and San Miguel 2018; Zhuang et al. 2017) and many models based
on epidemics have been proposed to study rumor and misinformation (Zhao et al. 2013;
Jin et al. 2013; de Arruda et al. 2016). Moreover, in models based on complex contagion
agents have only one possibility to activate their neighbors and never de-activate, meaning
that they do not take into account forgetting mechanisms. Considering misinformation
spreading, this is an important element to represent, since many psychological studies
suggest it has a significant role (Lewandowsky et al. 2012; Nyhan and Reifler 2010).
Our contribution
Following the epidemic approach we extended a compartmental model (Tambuscio et al.
2015) where the agents can be in one of the three states: Susceptible, if they ignore the
news, Believer, if they support the urban legend, or Fact Checker, if they decide to foster
the debunking. Evolution in time is given by transition rates that allow an agent to change
state, and these rates depend on the following parameters: the number of neighbors
Believers or Fact-Checker, the spreading rate β (common to both hoax and debunking),
the credibility of the hoax α (that gives some priority to misinformation but also can rep-
resent different propensities to believe), the forgetting rate pf (the probability for agents in
both Believer and Fact-Checker states to return to the Susceptible state). Since it is known
that bias and personal beliefs often prevent people to look for fact-checking (Nyhan and
Reifler 2010; Lewandowsky et al. 2012), we consider here the worst case in the frame-
work given by the model in Tambuscio et al. (2015), when no one verify the information
(meaning that it is not possible to switch from Believer to Fact-Checker state) and the
debunking spreads only as a competing opinion of the rumor.
We simulate spreading dynamics on three types of networks: scale free networks, net-
works formed by communities characterized by different values of credibility (including
a simulation on the well known ‘polblogs’ real network) and grid configurations obtained
by means of the Schelling segregation model. The parameter α in the model represents
the credibility of the hoax, i.e. the tendency that each agent has to believe to it. This is
an advantage for the misinformation piece, reflecting the results of several psychologi-
cal studies (Allport and Postman 1947; DiFonzo and Bordia 2007; Silverman 2015) that
indicate credibility (combined with repetition) is a strong enhancer for rumor diffusion;
the effect is even amplified if the story matches pre-existing beliefs (confirmation bias)
(Nyhan and Reifler 2010). Then it is reasonable to represent urban legends having some
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priority respect to their fact-check, at least for some communities. Under these condi-
tions, in absence of a transition Believer - Fact Checker (no verifying activity), the rumor
at some point affects the whole population and the debunking dies out, even for very low
values of α. Therefore, to limit the propagation of the rumor in such a configuration we
propose here to fix some nodes to be eternal Fact Checkers (i.e., that never return to be
Susceptible) and then we run several simulations to compare a group of strategies target-
ing different type of nodes as eternal fact checkers. For instance, if the network is highly
segregated, a solution to be tested would be to place fact-checkers on the frontier among
the clusters, so that we could exploit natural segregation to isolate the urban legend only
in some clusters. Nevertheless, if the frontier is not totally covered, the rumor can eventu-
ally go beyond it and propagate in the whole network. In this case, if the same number of
fact-checkers is placed in the higher degree nodes (hubs), the rumor diffusion can be par-
tially limited. We will discuss in detail these strategies through simulations of the model
in different network topologies, highlighting the fact that in each case we are able to find a
strategy that contains the misinformation: these findings can be useful in proposing new
policies to foster debunking and fight fake news spreading.
Themodel
Agents can be in three states: Susceptible (ignoring the news), Believer (believe it is true)
or Fact Checker (believe it is false), and the state can change according to transition rates.
In particular:
• assuming that a Susceptible agent can decide to believe in either the hoax or the fact
checking as a result of interaction over interpersonal ties (Rosnow and Fine 1976),
the rumor/debunking spreading (transitions S → B and S → F) depends on the
number of believers/fact-checkers among neighbors and on a parameter α that
represents the credibility of the legend;
• Believers and Fact Checkers can return to the Susceptible state with a fixed forgetting
probability pf (transitions B → S and F → S);
Please observe that this model is a ‘pessimistic’ variation of a previous model (Tambus-
cio et al. 2015), that also follows the traditional approach of epidemic spreading (Moreno
et al. 2004) to understand misinformation diffusion dynamics; in fact, in the previous
model, we introduced also the possibility for an agent to switch from Believer to Fact
Checker with a given verifying probability pv (Tambuscio et al. 2015), meaning that the
debunking can also be spread by external factors (online fact-checking platforms, for
instance). On the other hand we consider here the worst possible scenario to test our
strategies: users do not (want to) verify the news, they can only be influenced by their
Fact-Checker neighbors (if any) when they are in their Susceptible state. After they get a
position, they can only return to the Susceptible state if they forget what they learnt about
the news they have been previously exposed to.
Let us describe formally the model (also shown in Fig. 1). At each time t, each agent can
be in one of the three states: Susceptible (S), Believer (B) or Fact Checker (F), denoted by
a state indicator si(t) =
(
sSi , sBi , sFi
)
. For example, if the node 2 at time t is in the Believer
state, we will have s2(t) = (0, 1, 0). The triplet pi(t) =
[
pSi , pBi , pFi
]
is the vector of proba-
bilities that node i is in any of the states at time t. The dynamics of the system at time t+1
will be then given by a random realization of pi at t + 1:
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Fig. 1 A diagram of the model s.t. Susceptible (S) agents are exposed to the fake news and transact to a
Believer (B) or a Fact-Checker (F) state according to transition rates fi and gi , that are functions of the number
of neighbors ui in a given state, a credibility value α, and a spreading rate β . B and F agents can go back to
their S state because of a forgetting probability pf ; Note that we do not admit the possibility for a Believer to
transact to the Fact-Checker state because of an internal or external verification, as in our more ‘optimistic’
model presented in Tambuscio et al. (2015; 2018). In other words, we always set the so-called verifying
probability for B → F to 0
pBi (t + 1) = fi(t)sSi (t) + (1 − pf )sBi (t) (1)
pFi (t + 1) = gi(t)sSi (t) + (1 − pf )sFi (t) (2)
pSi (t + 1) = pf sBi (t) + pf sFi (t) +
[
1 − fi(t) − gi(t)
]
sSi (t) (3)
where pf is the forgetting probability, whereas fi and gi are the transition rates from S to B
and F respectively. These functions depend on the number of neighbors that are Believers
and Fact Checkers at time t, denoted, for each agent i, by nBi (t) and nFi (t). The functions
fi and gi are defined as follows:
fi(t) = β n
B
i (t)(1 + α)
nBi (t)(1 + α) + nFi (t)(1 − α)
(4)
gi(t) = β n
F
i (t)(1 − α)
nBi (t)(1 + α) + nFi (t)(1 − α)
(5)
where β ∈[ 0, 1] is the spreading rate and α ∈[ 0, 1) represents the credibility of the legend
(meaning that is more believable when α is close to 1) and give some priority to the piece
of misinformation respect to the debunking. Please observe that when α = 0 the hoax is
still able to spread, but there is not any advantage over the fact-checking.
Once the model has reached the equilibrium, we denote with S∞, B∞ and F∞ the
asymptotic density of agents in the three states.
In other words, we are representing an urban legend spreading with an opinion dynam-
ics model where the hoax compete with its debunking at a local level of the social
interaction of agents. Please notice that this model follows a SIS-like (Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible) dynamics where the Infected state is split into Believer and Fact
Checker compartments.
The networks
The goal of this work is comparing differnt strategies to limit the misinformation spread-
ing in a segregated society; in our simulations we will consider different types of networks
that exhibit several degrees of segregation. Let us briefly recap what we know about the
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role of the topology network in the model described in “The model” section. The origi-
nal version of the model, where the agents can verify a piece of information and switch
from Believer to Fact Checker, showed the same behavior on random, scale-free and
real networks (Tambuscio et al. 2015). The work described in Tambuscio et al. (2018)
focused on the evolution of the model dynamics in networks formed by two communi-
ties, one made of more gullible agents, while the other is set to be more skeptic: these
communities exhibit different propensities to believe (different values of α): extensive
simulations show that the segregation level of the network can both help to spread or
stop the misinformation, depending on the forgetting rate. In particular these networks
were artificially generated rewiring two random networks, obtaining different levels of
segregation.
In the following lines we will introduce the networks on which we tested our experi-
ments and debunking strategies to perform our what-if analysis with our new model.
Synthetic scale-free networks
First, we run our model on scale free networks artificially generated by means of a
Barabasi-Albert process with m = 3. The networks we created have N = 1000 nodes
and M ≈ 3000 links, with a mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6. Second, we consider, as in Tambuscio
et al. (2018), a network formed by two clusters where the agents have different tenden-
cies to believe (α), but we start with two totally separated scale free networks and then
we rewire them randomly. More specifically, at the beginning (ρ = 0) we have two com-
pletely segregated networks that represent the two communities (the gullible one has a
higher tendency to believe, α = 0.8, whereas the skeptic has a lower one, α = 0.3). We
consider a parameter ρ ∈[ 0, 1] and perform ρ · M rewiring trials keeping the degree dis-
tribution of the nodes, whereM is the total number of edges of the networks.When ρ ≈ 1
the obtained network is well mixed, meaning that half of the links connect the two com-
munities. In this framework, we will explore what happens fixing some nodes as eternal
Fact-Checkers (pf = 0), choosing them at random, among the nodes with highest degree
(hubs), or among the nodes on the boundary between the two communities. To allow a
comparison with the first case we started with two networks of 500 nodes, then the result-
ing networks have the same number of nodes (N = 1000) and links (M ≈ 3000) of the
ones considered before. In Fig. 2a-b there are two examples of networks generated with
different values of ρ.
Observations: In our previous works Tambuscio et al. (2015; 2018) we ran our sim-
ulations with varying values of N. We understood that when N is larger (up to 10,000),
the general behavior does not change, hence we kept N smaller to run many different
realizations of the model faster.
It is also important to observe that scale-free artificial networks showing differ-
ent segregation values could have been generated by means of configuration models.
In our comparative what-if analysis we used three different topologies (BA graphs,
Shelling based networks, and PolBlog as a network built up from real data), and we
observed comparable behaviors, that led us to conclude it was not necessary to sim-
ulate our strategies on another family of artificially generated graphs. Nevertheless,
it is true that configuration models have less drawbacks in terms of non-trivial cor-
relations than BA networks, and so an additional analysis can be performed as a
future work.
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Fig. 2 Networks topologies considered in the paper. Scale-free networks with gullible communities with
different values of ρ : highly segregated, with ρ = 0.05 (a) and well mixed, or not segregated, with ρ = 0.8
(b). We also show some visualizations of networks generated by means of Schelling configurations with
different values of density D and preference P: D = 0.7, P = 0.5 in (c) and P: D = 0.9, P = 0.3 in (d). Different
visualizations of Shelling based networks are shown to emphasize the segregation patterns within the grid,
than to allow an intuitive comparison with scale-free networks with the application of a force-based layout
Real networks
We considered a real network (POLBLOGS) between weblogs on US politics, collected
during US elections in 2004 (Adamic and Glance 2005). We chose this network because
is formed by two labeled communities that reflect somehow an opinion (belief ) of the
nodes, and we considered them as gullible and skeptic groups described before, assigning
them different values of credibility. Specifically, we used a modified version of the original
network: we mapped the directed graph to an undirected one, we selected the largest
connected component, lowering the number of vertices from 1490 to 1222, and finally we
removed all multi-edges and loops, lowering the number of edges from 16725 to 16714.
Synthetic Schelling networks
Finally, we considered the Schelling segregation model as a simple representation of a
segregated urban environment (Schelling 2006). In this model two groups of agents are
randomly placed on a grid of size S. The number of agents N is obtained by a densityD as
N = D∗S2. A parameter P denotes the preference, i.e., the desired fraction of neighbors of
the same type for all the agents. These preference can also be seen as an inverse measure
of tolerance (a lower preference corresponds to higher number of neighbors of a different
type). Clearly in a random configuration there will be some unsatisfied agents: at each
time t they move to an empty cell. Running the simulations, different configurations can
be obtained: when there is an equilibrium (all the agents are satisfied) the network results
to be segregated in small communities of the same group Fig. 2c-d.
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This class of topologies is interesting because the spatial segregation arises from the
local effect of homophily based on more ‘immutable’ characteristics of the individual (i.e.,
ethnicity, religion, language, and so on): urban networks can be shaped very differently
w.r.t. a (on-line) social network. Indeed, even for a low value of P we can obtain these
segregated configurations, see Fig. 2c-d. Here, we run the Schelling model with S = 35 so
that, varying D in [ 0.7, 0.9] we have N ≈ 1000. We consider the final configuration of the
model as the starting one for our simulations: the two groups represent the gullible and
skeptic agents, and they are assigned with different values of α.
Results
In our model agents can become Believer or Fact-Checker only if they are infected by
their neighbors, then we start our simulations with a population of Susceptible agents and
some Believer and Fact-Checker seeders (B0 = F0 = 0.1∗N). To understand the behavior
of the model in different configurations we performed extensive numerical simulations
fixing for simplicity the spreading rate beta = 0.5 and the forgetting probability pf = 0.1.
Scale-free networks without gullible communities
First of all we consider a simple Barabasi-Albert network with N=1000 nodes and we set
the Believer and Fact Checker seeders at random. In this configuration, the urban legend
wins over its debunking that completely disappears (F∞ = 0), even for low values of
credibility (see Fig. 3). Neither increasing the number of Fact Checker seeders helps: the
curve of debunkers goes to 0 in any case, but more slowly. Notice that α does not affect
the asymptotic number of Believers, B∞. This is because, in our model, the asymptotic
number of Susceptible agents depends only on pf and β (it can be easily obtained by the
Eq. 3, for details see Tambuscio et al. (2015)): then, if F∞ = 0, also B∞ does not depend
on the credibility, that affects only the rate of Believers and Fact-Checkers in the global
spread.
Then, our goal is to explore strategies to limit, even if not defeating, the hoax spread-
ing. The main idea is to fix some nodes as eternal Fact Checkers (eFC), meaning that
some of them never forget their belief (pf = 0). On the other hand, it is reasonable to
think that there are some individuals that do not believe to the hoax and that will never
change their opinion. We tested two ways of choosing these individuals: randomly and
Fig. 3 Scale-Free Network: dynamics of the model on a Barabasi-Albert network of N = 1000 nodes, starting
with B0 = 100 seeders Believer and F0 = 100 seeders Fact Checker. Each plot refers to the averaged value of
densities over 20 simulations. For different values of credibility (α = 0.3 in (a) and α = 0.8 in (b)), we have the
same configuration at the equilibrium: the debunking dies out, whereas the misinformation becomes
endemic
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among the highest degree nodes (hubs). For simplicity we set the number of eternal Fact
Checkers equal to F0, meaning that they are exactly the seeders. In the first case we set
randomly in the network the eternal Fact Checkers and we obtain a small but important
effect (F∞ > 0) in the case of low credibility (see Fig. 4a) that limits the hoax spreading.
However, with higher values of credibility, the misinformation still reaches the whole net-
work (see Fig. 4b) and the Fact Checkers die out (only the eFC survive at the equilibrium).
In the second case we consider the first F0 highest degree nodes: this strategy is absolutely
winning. For low values of credibility the hoax is almost eradicated (see Fig. 4c), while for
high values of credibility there is a substantial reduction and in both cases the debunking
becomes endemic at equilibrium (see Fig. 4d). Clearly the strategy is promising, suggest-
ing that a systematic activity of debunkers can be useful even if people do not verify the
news, just because they create a spreading dynamics on their own.
Scale-free networks with gullible communities
We consider here the case in which there is a gullible community, as proposed in
Tambuscio et al. (2018). The network is built as described in “The networks” section,
rewiring two Barabasi-Albert networks of N/2 nodes that represent gullible and skeptic
communities: to characterize them we set α = 0.8 for the first group, meaning that the
legend is highly credible for them, and α = 0.3 for the second, meaning that the legend is
Fig. 4 Scale Free Network, debunking strategies: different strategies of choosing some nodes as eternal Fact
Checkers with different values of credibility: (a) at random with α = 0.3, (b) at random with α = 0.8, (c)
among the highest degree nodes with α = 0.3 (d) among the highest degree nodes with α = 0.8. Each plot
refers to the averaged value of densities over 20 simulations on a Barabasi-Albert network of N = 1000
nodes, starting with B0 = 100 seeders Believer and F0 = 100 seeders Fact Checker. Please, observe that in the
upper row it looks like that F∞ is less than
F0
N
= 0.1, that is trivially impossible because F0 are eternal
Fact-Checkers. This is due to a trivial over-plotting issue
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not so credible for the agents in this group. At t = 0 there are B0 = 0.1 ∗N Believer seed-
ers in the gullible community and F = 0.1 ∗ N Fact Checker seeders in the skeptic one.
The results are reported in Fig. 5: we included both the single simulation and the aver-
aged dynamics to emphasize the moment when, during a single realization placing the
Fact Checkers on the frontier (Fig. 5d), the Believers ‘invade’ the skeptic group. This ‘inva-
sion’ is something that eventually happens, even if in some single realizations this event
appears after many time iterations: indeed it is interesting to notice that the equilibrium
in this case is reached after significantly more time iterations respect to other cases.
Fig. 5 Synthetic Segregated Networks. Different strategies of choosing some nodes as eternal Fact Checkers
(eFC) in a segregated network with skeptic and gullible communities: a no eFC, b eFC at random in the
skeptic community, c eFC in the highest degree nodes of the skeptic community, d eFC on the frontier
among the two communities (nodes in the skeptic group that are connected with nodes in the gullible one).
The plots on the left column represent the dynamics of just one simulation of the model to emphasize the
moment in which the Believer invade the skeptic community in case (d). The plots on the right column show
the average dynamics over 20 simulations. Moreover, for cases (a), (b) and (c) the equilibrium is reached at
t < 200, while in (d) we needed t ≈ 400 time iterations
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Running the simulation without debunking strategies (see Fig. 5a) the misinformation
can conquer all the network: even a highly segregated community (half of the entire pop-
ulation) formed by skeptic people with low tendency to believe to an hoax is not enough
to limit the urban legend spreading. Then we fix, as in the previous case, some skeptic
nodes as eternal Fact Checker and we try three different strategies to choose them: ran-
domly, among the highest degree nodes, among the nodes on the frontier. As before, in
all the three cases, for simplicity we set the number of eternal Fact Checkers equal to
F0: in the case of the frontier if the network is highly segregated and we saturated all the
possible nodes we choose the remaining eternal Fact Checkers at random in the skeptic
community.
In the first case, setting the eternal Fact Checkers at random (see Fig. 5b), we can see
that the misinformation is partially limited, but it still reaches the skeptic community and
stays endemic at the equilibrium. The second strategy, choosing the hubs (see Fig. 5c), has
indeed an important effect, limiting the global spreading of the hoax (that is now basically
confined in the gullible community) and it guarantees a constant high number of Fact
Checker in the skeptic community (with a slightly better result for the real network, that
can depend on the segregation level, as we will see next). Finally, the third case, locating
the eternal debunkers on the frontier among the communities, is very interesting, because
two events can occur. If the frontier is totally covered by the eternal Fact Checker, trivially
we have the best possible result in this framework: the misinformation is totally confined
in the gullible community and the skeptic one is totally protected by its “watchers” (look at
the first time iterations of first column plot in Fig. 5d). But, even if there is only one possi-
ble “door”, at some point the Believer agents can invade the skeptic community and at the
equilibrium we have number of endemic Fact Checker very similar to the first case (see
first column plot in Fig. 5d when t ≈ 150). We would like to remark that here we are con-
sidering a toy-network in a borderline case of two communities more or less connected:
the nodes on the frontier then represent the bridges of our network, and, indeed, they
exhibit high values of betweenness centrality on average, specially for higher segregation.
Therefore the most powerful strategy would be the third, but only if it is possible to
cover all the frontier with the eternal Fact Checkers. However, since we are exploring
possible solutions to limit misinformation in the real world where new links form contin-
uously and keeping a community totally protected is not achievable, we can conclude that
the best strategy, among the proposed ones, is the second, fixing eternal Fact Checkers
among the hubs of the network.
However, we simulated only the case of F0 = 0.1 ∗N eternal Fact Checkers: we want to
explore now what happens if we consider just a fraction of F0 hubs (h ∈[ 0, 1]) or nodes on
the frontier (w ∈[ 0, 1]). Moreover, we are also interested in how the segregation affects
the number of Believer and Fact Checker agents at equilibrium, then we also consider a
range of values for ρ ∈[ 0, 1], the parameter that rules the number of rewiring trials (see
“The networks” section). Then we run several simulations showing the results in Figs. 6
and 7. In the first figure each tile [ h, ρ] represents the density at equilibrium of Believ-
ers
(
B∞
N
)
or Fact Checkers
(
F∞
N
)
on the average of 20 simulations with h ∗ F0 eternal
Fact Checker agents and ρ ∗ M rewiring trials. We remind that the network is more seg-
regated when ρ ≈ 0. Similarly, in the second for [w, ρ]. In both cases (Figs. 6 and 7) we
can observe that increasing the number of skeptic hubs/watchers fixed as eternal Fact
Checkers helps a little bit in limiting the hoax spreading. Specifically, comparing the two
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Fig. 6 EternalFC among the skeptic hubs. Phase diagrams that show the densities of Believers and Fact
Checkers at equilibrium obtained by simulations of the model in a network of N = 1000 nodes, formed by
two communities of 500 agents associated with different values of α: the gullible (αgu = 0.8) and the skeptic
(αsk = 0.3). The fixed parameters are β = 0.5 and pf = 0.1. Each cell (h, ρ) corresponds to the averaged value
of the relative density over 20 simulations with h ∗ F0 eternal Fact Checkers (chosen among the highest
degree nodes in the skeptic community) and ρ ∗ M rewiring trials, where h, ρ ∈[ 0, 1]
figures, it is clear that the hubs strategy is the most effective one, since the number of
Fact-Checkers at equilibrium is significantly higher. On the other hand, we notice that
increasing the number of links among the communities (i.e. increasing ρ) causes a larger
spreading of the misinformation in the skeptic community (and consequently a smaller
number of Fact Checkers). This means (once again) that the role of network segrega-
tion is absolutely nontrivial: in the version of the model with verifying probability 	= 0
(Tambuscio et al. 2018) it was found that segregation indeed helps the spread of the
hoax for low forgetting rates. Here we obtain, apparently surprisingly, the opposite
result: network segregation helps the debunking. But this is not a conflicting results:
if the gullible agents have the possibility to fact-check, the debunking will eventually
spread also in the gullible community and, when this group is more isolated, the hoax
Fig. 7 EternalFC among the skeptic watchers. Phase diagrams that show the densities of Believers and Fact
Checkers at equilibrium obtained by simulations of the model in a network of N = 1000 nodes, formed by
two communities of 500 agents associated with different values of α: the gullible (αgu = 0.8) and the skeptic
(αsk = 0.3). The fixed parameters are β = 0.5 and pf = 0.1. Each cell (w, ρ) corresponds to the averaged
value of the relative density over 20 simulations with w ∗ F0 eternal Fact Checkers (chosen among the skeptic
nodes that are connected with gullible ones) and ρ ∗ M rewiring trials
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has more probabilities to survive. Conversely, when agents do not have the possibil-
ity to verify, the debunking can only be spread from the skeptic group, then if the two
communities are more polarized, it has more chances to not be eradicated from the
network.
Real-world segregated networks
To test our model not only on synthetic networks, we also considered a real network with
similar features, the network POLBLOGS described in Sec. 2. This network exhibits two
highly segregated communities, and the nodes are labeled with their political alignment
(conservative or liberal). We produced two configurations to test our model, considering
first the two labeled groups as the gullible and the skeptic communities and then vice-
versa: Fig. 8 show the results of these simulations. Even if not completely identical, both
cases reflect the same behavior and the hubs strategy is again the best one possible: in the
second configuration we observe better outcomes for Fact-Checkers for all the strategies,
and this is probably due to the fact that the two communities does not have the same
size, as in the simulations (one is formed by 636 nodes, the other one by 586). Moreover,
comparing these plots with Fig. 5, it is easy to see that simulations on synthetic and real
segregated networks produce analogous results, specially in the second case, for which
we have an extraordinary similarity.
Schelling model networks
In this section we consider another type of segregated network: the grid configuration of
the Schelling segregation model after the equilibrium is reached (see Sec. 2). This agent
based model showed that segregation is something that can arise even in very tolerant
contexts and has been used for instance to study residential segregation of ethnic groups:
empirical evidences supporting Schelling-like patterns were observed between the Jew-
ish and Arabs communities in Israel (Hatna and Benenson 2012). The Schelling grids at
equilibrium provide us a framework to test the hoax spreading model and its debunking
strategies on a segregated urban environment where the topology of the network is inher-
ently shaped by social and human attributes that historically led to separate and isolate
groups (ethnicity, religion, gender, language etc).
We assigned different values of α to the agents of the two groups to determine
gullible/skeptic communities and we placed the Believer and Fact Checker seeders among
the gullible and the skeptic respectively. Figure 9 shows the dynamics evolution for dif-
ferent values of densities D and preferences P. We chose values of preference P and
density D that guarantee a largest connected component formed by more than 95% of
the nodes N, so that we can exclude trivial cases in which there are totally isolated com-
munities in which of course the hoax or the debunking survive without competitors. As
in the previous cases, the hoax easily wins over the debunking in the spreading compe-
tition, reaching all the network, then we try to fix some nodes as eternal Fact Checkers.
Here we do not consider the strategy of placing these nodes in the hubs, simply because
it is meaningless on a grid. Then, let us consider the possibility to locate the eternal
debunkers randomly in the skeptic network or to place them on the frontiers. Surpris-
ingly, both strategies can limit partially the misinformation spreading, but with much
less evident effect respect to the scale-free networks. We set the Schelling configuration
with S = 35 so that, varying D in [ 0.7, 0.9] we have N ≈ 1000, and we considered an
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Fig. 8 Real Segregated Networks. Different strategies of choosing some nodes as eternal Fact Checkers (eFC)
in a real segregated network (Adamic and Glance 2005) with skeptic and gullible communities: a no eFC, b
eFC at random in the skeptic community, c eFC in the highest degree nodes of the skeptic community, d eFC
on the frontier among the two communities (nodes in the skeptic group that are connected with nodes in
the gullible one). The two columns represent two different assignment of gullible/skeptic communities to
the labeled groups of the considered real network
average value P = 0.5 for the preference of similar neighbors. In Fig. 9 it is quite clear that
the debunking becomes endemic (in the skeptic community) but it does not disappear.
The strategies have the same effect: the legend spreading is restrained a little bit and the
debunking becomes endemic (in the skeptic community) but it does not disappear. The
second strategy reaches the equilibrium more slowly (see Fig. 9b and d).
Discussion
Summarizing, we focused on the worst scenario provided by a misinformation spreading
model, based on epidemics, in which agents can be infected by an urban legend or by its
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Fig. 9 Schelling Networks. Simulations of the model on grid networks obtained by the Schelling model with
a grid size S = 35 and a fixed preference of similar neighbors P = 0.5. Here we considered different values of
densities and two strategies of placing 0.1 ∗ N eternal Fact Checkers (eFC): a D = 0.7 and eFC chosen at
random in the skeptic group, b D = 0.7 and eFC chosen among the skeptic nodes on the frontier between
the two groups, c D = 0.9 and eFC chosen at random in the skeptic community, d D = 0.9 and eFC chosen
among the skeptic nodes on the frontier between the two groups. Each plot show the spreading dynamics
curves obtained by 20 simulations
debunking, then they can forget their belief about it and turn to be infected again; nev-
ertheless, our pessimistic assumption is that once agents opted to become Believers, they
will not verify the news anymore keeping their belief (until they forget their position). We
defined this as the worst possible scenario because the fact-checking can only be broad-
cast trough neighbors contagion, meaning that the debunking platforms and activities
could appear useless and inefficient. Indeed, not surprisingly, under these assumptions
our simulations show that the hoax easily becomes endemic and the debunking disap-
pears. In order to limit misinformation, this is a quite negative results: this is reflected
by some other relevant studies that show how fact checking can be not effective and
sometimes counterproductive (Butler et al. 2011; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Lewandowsky
et al. 2012), while the hoaxes proliferate creating highly polarized communities in the
communication networks (Del Vicario et al. 2016; Bessi et al. 2015).
Nevertheless, keeping this pessimistic scenario, we tested some fact checking strategies
that involve the introduction of eternal fact-checkers, agents that support the debunking
and never forget their belief: the location of these agents has a crucial role in shaping the
global diffusion of the urban legend and its debunking at equilibrium.
First, our simulation results on scale-free networks show that fixing the highest degree
nodes as the eternal fact-checkers is the more successful strategy in limiting the hoax
spreading, while choosing them randomly has a lower effect (even if the debunking
at equilibrium survives, trivially in the immediate neighborhood of the eternal fact-
checkers).
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Second, in order to explore the role of segregation, we run our simulations on two types
of polarized networks where the segregation is achieved in two different ways.
• In the first case, scale-free networks (synthetic and real) formed by two communities
more or less segregated, the winning strategy is (again) to fix the skeptic hubs as
eternal debunkers. This is more powerful than fixing them at random or on the
frontier, that would be the most powerful strategy only when it is totally covered by
eternal fact-checkers but this is clearly not affordable, since the real networks are
dynamics. Indeed, in this case our simulations highlight that eventually the hoax
finds a way to “dig through the wall” and spread in the other community, becoming
endemic in it even if the agents in this group are more skeptic, i.e. they are less likely
to believe to the urban legend. Then the frontier approach has the same outcome of
the random one, both in synthetic and real segregated networks. Moreover, we find
that in this framework of the model (when there is not verifying activity) the
segregation of the network can restrain the misinformation spread because it
prevents that the hoax spread in the skeptic community. For comparison with the
framework in which agents can verify the news (then some Believer turn into Fact
Checker) see Tambuscio et al. (2015; 2018).
• In the second case, the network is obtained by a realization of the Schelling model,
i.e. it is a grid and every node has a low degree (k ≤ 8) then we can not consider hubs.
Nevertheless, fixing some eternal fact-checkers (at random or on the frontiers among
the groups) works as well in limiting the legend spreading.
To draw a conclusion from our experimental settings, our what-if analysis show evi-
dences that, even in a very pessimistic scenario where no one verify the news, some
debunking strategies can be applied and have a partial success in limiting the misinfor-
mation spread, specially exploiting the presence of more skeptic agents in the network.
Conversely, a censorship action on the nodes that broadcast hoaxes could not be help-
ful since new nodes can easily replace the silenced ones. Therefore, our results can surely
be helpful in developing new policies to build fact-checking platforms and to foster their
usage.
Conclusions
Misinformation is surely one of the most dangerous risks of our hyper-connected society
and some proposed solutions involve the creation of accounts’ blacklists or the develop-
ment of tools to give less visibility to specific items labeled as fake news. Then interesting
questions are arising (John Borthwick 2016): how to legislate without limiting freedom of
speech and which authority should trust to an eventual law-making of the Internet? With
this intent many fact-checking platforms have been proposed1.
How these projects can become more effective? In this work we considered a simplified
version of an epidemics-based model where the misinformation spreading is described
only as a competition process among an urban legend and its debunking. The fact check-
ing activity of the debunkers has been frequently labeled as useless and counterproductive
because of psychological and social factors. Then we focused on the worst case scenario:
1http://www.disinfobservatory.org/, https://weverify.eu/, http://www.truly.media/
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the agents can not verify the news, and the debunking can only be spread at a neighbor-
hood level influencing agents that have not taken a position against or in favor a given
fake news yet. We proved that, in different network topologies, the strategy of fixing the
belief of a portion of the Fact-Checkers can indeed limit the misinformation spreading,
even if the location of these agents has a big influence on the success of these strate-
gies. This could mean that, even if the debunking services provided by the main stream
media or online platforms are not much visited, they are still useful to restrain a fake news
diffusion, specially if their usage is strategically coordinated by a skeptic community.
In the future we would like to collect data to better validate our model, developing a
platform in which users can express their belief towards a news and some agents can be
activated as eternal Fact-Checkers in strategic locations of the network. Moreover, on the
theoretical side, we would like to explore next what happens on networks made of n > 2
communities with different propensities to believe.
We think that our findings, based on a what-if analysis that helped us to study a domain
where we do not have enough data, can help to shed lights on the understanding of
the complex phenomenon of misinformation spreading. Specifically, they can suggest
new debunking policies to empower the existing fact-checking platforms or new social
experiments in real contexts to test the proposed strategies and the role of segregation.
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